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PSYCHIATRY AND THE COURTS IN
MASSACHUSETTS
WINFRED OVERHOLSER, M. D.1
In the daily press, as well as in the flood of magazine articles
and books on the subject of crime written by some of the amateur
criminologists, of whom there is a "bumper" crop at present, we
hear much criticism of expert testimony, with particular reference
to the psychiatrists, and of the defense of insanity. These would-
be saviors of the country, who seem to lack any historical perspective,
feel that they have discovered something entirely new and would
assure us that if the abuse of expert testimony can only be stopped,
the epidemic of crime, supposed to be now raging, will at once sub-
side. That there is nothing particularly novel in this criticism of
such testimony may be seen by reference to a case decided by the
Court of Appeals, of New York in 1890. The court in this case
made the following comments: "The frequent spectacle of scientific
experts differing in their opinions upon a case according to the side
upon which they are retained tends much to discredit such testimony
or to impair its force and usefulness and inclines us to prefer the
formation of an opinion upon the.real facts when the case is not one
beyond the penetration and grasp of an ordinary mind."'2
Perhaps one of the reasons why so much attention is drawn to
the question of mental alienation in criminal cases is that some of
the most startling, unusual and brutal crimes have been committed
by persons who were distinctly deranged mentally. As a result of
the striking nature of the crimes much attention has been attracted
to them and an intense desire for revenge on the part of the crowd
has been aroused. In some instances, as in the Guiteau case, the fact
of mental disease has been reasoned away by the jury in order that
the sadistic desires of the mob might be satisfied. In most cases,
IDirector, Division for the Examination of Prisoners, Department of Men-
tal Diseases, Boston, Mass. This article was read before the American Ortho-
psychiatric Association at Cincinnati, Ohio, June 3, 1927.2People v. Kemnler, 119 N. Y. 580, at 583. Compare also this extract from
the judge's charge in Guieatt's Case (1881) 10 Fed. 161 (at 165) : "The defense
of insanity has been so abused as to be brought into great discredit. It has been
the last resort in cases of questionable guilt and has been the excuse to juries for
acquittal when their own and the public sympathy have been with the accused, and
especially when the provocation to homicide has excused it according to public
sentiment, but not according to law. For these reasons, it is viewed with suspi-
cion and disfavor whenever public sentiment is hostile to the accused."
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however, the fact that the defendant was insane and therefore ir-
responsible has prevented execution, as it should, and in this way the
demand foil blood has not been fulfilled. The fact that the popular
attitude in this matter is emotionally conditioned is obvious to the
psychiatrists, and it is particularly noticeable that those who are the
most vociferous in demanding abolition of the "defense of insanity"
are those who, at least apparently, are not familiar with the traditions
of the law or the aims of psychiatry. As a calm, judicial statement
of what is to be desired, let me quote from a recent book which pur-
ports to be a scientific study of the intelligence of criminals: "But
the great and crowning glory in the practice of criminal law is the
protection offered to the insane and the methods made available for
facilitating proof of insanity. If a criminal is insane, that is all the
more reason for extinguishing him from society. He can never be
of any service to the state or himself." The author (presumably to
emphasize his independence) then goes on to admit that "practically
all the literature of the last fifty years in the fields of criminology
and penology has fostered the development of this maternalistic
fallacy." The classical writers on the English Common Law were
not the type of men who would today be called "coddlers of crim-
inals" or "sentimentalists." As a contrast, therefore, to this 20th-
century effusion it is refreshing to read Blackstone's dictum: "If
a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before
arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned
for it, because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and
caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner
becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his de-
fense ?"1
The English common law recognized intent as a necessary ele-
ment in crime and likewise recognized the fact that absence of such
intent, due to mental irresponsibility, meant that no punishable offense
had been committed. The principle went farther than this and held
that a man should not even be tried if he became insane after the
crime was committed, since it was unfair to him to try him while
his mental condition was such that he could not intelligently defend
himself. The law, in. short, at least intended to be fair to the de-
fendant, although it must be admitted that some of the "tests" laid
down were inadequate to cover all the cases which they should. As a
recognition of inadequacy of the "tests," the following remarks of
3Blackstone, "Commentaries on the Laws of England," bk. IV, p. 24 (1765).
Ed Cooley, Pub., Chicago, 1899.
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the judge to the jury in the course of his charge on the case of
Guiteau are peculiarly a propos: "But assuming that the infirmity
of mind has had a direct influence on the production of the crime,
the difficulty is to fix the degree and character of the disorder which
in such case will create irresponsibility. The outgivings of the judi-
cial mind on this subject have not always been entirely satisfactory
or in harmony with the conclusions of medical science. Courts have
in former times undertaken to lay down a law of insanity without
reference to and in ignorance of the medical aspects of the subject
when it could only be properly dealt with through a concurrent and
harmonious treatment by the two sciences of law and medicine."'4
The procedure in the matter has been limited by statutes in
the various jurisdictions, but as a rule, it has been agreed that if
a man were alleged to be insane, the issue of insanity should first
be determined either by the court, by commission, or by jury, and
that trial upon the issue of the commission of the act should not
be held unless the defendant was found to be sane.
The State of California has apparently been suffering lately
from a certain degree of panic over the crime situation, and has re-
cently passed a law which reverses this usual procedure.5 Under
this law, if the defense of insanity is to be introduced, the defendant
must so plead before the trial. Presumably, of course, the defend-
ant will recognize the premonitory symptons sufficiently in advance
to notify authorities that he is about to undergo an attack of mental
disease! One is moved to inquire how much notice should be ex-
pected from a defendant who is suffering from mental disease at
the time of his offense and continues to suffer in this way. Be that
as it may, presuming that the patient has recognized the symptons
and has communicated them to the proper authorities, he is next
tried on the question as to whether or not he committed the act.
Assuming now that the man is definitely psychotic, he is submitted
to a trial before a jury on the issue of facts as to the offense, a
principle directly contradictory to that of the common law. If he is
found to have committed the act in question the issue of his sanity
is then tried before the same jury or another (perhaps the less said
about the desirability of jury trials on the issue of sanity the better)
and presuming he is found to be insane, he will be committed to an
appropriate institution. Furthermore, even release from the hospital
after such commitment is made a matter of determination by the
4Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161, at 166-7.
"Ch. 677, Acts of 1927. Effective July 29, 1927.
WINFRED OVERHOLSER
court. It is sincerely to be hoped that California will see the wisdom
eventually of returning to her former practice, which was not only
legally sounder, but also much fairer to the accused.
It must be admitted, however, that the appearances at least in
certain cases have been such as to make the public distrust the honesty
and sincerity of expert testimony. We are, of course, familiar with
the fact that the cases in which there has been dispute have often
been borderline cases in which there is room for an honest difference
of opinion. Judges have been known to disagree on the interpreta-
tion of laws, and in the same way physicians may be expected to
disagree at times on the interpretation of symptoms. For this reason,
it has been possible to find experts who will testify for either side,
but the public and even the court have not been always able to see
that the diagnosis of a mental situation, especially with regard to
responsibility is a much more complicated matter than the diagnosis
for instance of a fractured humerus.
One reason for the apparent and in some instances actual abuse
of the plea of insanity has been the fact that initiation of the plea
has depended upon laymen. There are various groups of laymen
who may initiate these proceedings, as for instance, the judge, the
prison officials and, of course, the defense attorney. As a result
of the non-medical status of the introduction of this plea, the cases
in which proceedings have been begun are either the obvious ones,
those in which there is but little doubt even in the minds of laymen,
or those in which a plea of insanity appears to be advantageous
strategy for the defense. That the plea has been made in some cases
without justification in fact must be admitted. The upshot of this
situation is that the whole matter becomes a partisan one. Some dis-
trict attorneys, inclined to estimate their success by the number of
convictions they obtain, are prone, instead of endeavoring to deter-
mine the truth where an issue of insanity is raised, to contest the plea
regardless of the facts. Instead of permitting the psychiatrists re-
tained by the two sides to consult with each other in an effort to
agree on the facts, they assume that the other side is made up en-
tirely of incapable or dishonest men and insist on "fighting the matter
out" in court. There is little doubt too, that some defendants suffer-
ing from mental disease who have been inadequately represented by
counsel or who have not been recognized as being mentally ill have
been convicted and punished as though sane. The present disrepute
of expert testimony is much more the fault of the machinery than
it is of the individual psychiatrists or even of the lawyers. Courts
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and even juries are willing to be advised if only they can know whom
to trust, but the existing legal system is such that it is not strange that
a certain amount of suspicion is directed against the experts. In
view of such suspicion, it is not strange that courts have not availed
themselves oftener of their common-law right to call in advisers as
amici curiae.
Certain courts under the guidance of progressive and intelligent
judges have established psychiatric clinics, the court psychiatrist being
an officer of the court and his recommendations naturally having
weight. Even in such cases, however, a certain amount of selection
has usually been exercised as to the cases examined and in most
cases the psychiatrist has functioned only after conviction. A special
interest, therefore, attaches to the fact that Massachusetts in 1921
took a step along medico-legal lines which is little short of revolution-
ary. This law, the passage of which was due almost entirely to the
personal efforts of Dr. L. Vernon Briggs of Boston, provides that
certain classes of felons shall be examined before trial by psychiatrists
appointed by the Department of Mental Diseases. The essential fea-
tures of the law itself are included in the following quotation: "When-
ever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital offense or
whenever a person, who is known to have been indicted for any other
offense more than once or to have been previously convicted of a
felony, is indicted by a grand jury or bound over for trial in the
superior court, the clerk of the court in which the indictment is re-
turned, or the clerk of the district court or the trial justice, as the
case may be, shall give notice to the department of mental diseases,
and the department shall cause such person to be examined with a
view to determine his mental condition and the existence of any men-
tal disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility.
The department shall file a report of its investigation with the clerk
of the court in which the trial is to be held, and the report shall be
accessible to the court, the district attorney, and to the attorney for
the accused."8 Upon the receipt of notice, from the court the De-
partment of Mental Diseases appoints two psychiatrists to make the
examination required. At least one of the psychiatrists is usually
connected with the department in some capacity, one of the purposes
of this arrangement being that the services of the department's social
workers and psychologists in obtaining history and making psycho-
metric tests are thus available. The importance of such history and
psychometric examination is emphasized by the department, an at-
6Ch. 169, Acts of 1925. Originally enacted as Ch. 415, Acts of 1921, effec-
tive-Aug. 20, 1921. Amended by Ch. 331,.Acts of 1923.
80 WINFRED OVERHOLSER
tempt being made to encourage thorough examination and report. The
examiners are impartial, being retained by neither the dis-
trict attorney, by the defense, nor by the court. The report is avail-
able to all parties to the case, and the examining psychiatrists may
be summoned into court by either side to present the results of their
examination if the findings are desired as evidence. The mere fact
that these psychiatrists are impartial adds immeasurably to the strength
of their position if their evidence is introduced in court. Fully as
important as the impartiality of the report, however, is the fact that
this examination is a routine one. It is applicable to certain groups
regardless of whether or not they are suspected by any one of suffer-
ing from mental disease or whether their counsel intends to resort
to the "defense of insanity." The examination is made without any
presupposition or subconscious desires as to what the examiner shall
find. In nearly every instance the defendant has cooperated fully
in the examination, and for the benefit of those who may have some
doubts about self-incrimination, it may be said that in practically
every instance the attorney for the defense, where there was any
hesitancy on the part of the prisoner, has instructed his client to
co6perate.
One result of this law has been that the duels between experts
on opposing sides have been almost entirely eliminated in criminal
cases. In the last six years there have been almost no criminal cases
where the spectacle has been presented of experts arrayed on either
side and giving conflicting testimony. The courts and the district
attorneys, recognizing the impartial character of the report, have
shown a most encouraging willingness to accept the findings and to
abide by them. By making comprehensive, clear, and non-technical
reports, psychiatrists have had a splendid opportunity to present
to the courts and district attorneys some of the principles of the
psychiatric point of view.
In the case of prisoners found to be insane, the prisoner has
been committed to a State Hospital, a trial usually being avoided
completely. In a few cases, a formal verdict of "not guilty by reason
of insanity" has been returned so that the case was definitely closed
rather than being filed.. Under either procedure, protracted and ex-
pensive trials have been avoided, and the necessity of bringing a
mentally ill defendant into court to undergo trial has been obviated.
Society has been protected better than otherwise; not only has the
psychotic or mentally defective offender been segregated in the in-
stitution where he belongs, but his commitment has been made with
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such provisions that he is not likely to be released until his mental
condition 'warrants. In the case of an insane killer, for instance,
acquitted by reason of insanity, the statute provides that he must
be sentenced for life to a State Hospital. Release can be secured
only by pardon from the Governor after the latter is assured by the
Department of Mental Diseases that the patient is in such mental
condition that "his discharge will not cause danger to others." Safe-
guards are also thrown about the release of the insane who have com-
mitted other offenses.7 The advantage of such an arrangement over
the system of automatic parole, expiration of definite terms of im-
prisonment, or politically motivated commutations and pardons is
obvious.
From the passage of the law in 1921 until October 15, 1926, 367
cases had been reported to the department, of whom 72 were not
examined. The most of those not examined were missed because
bail had been given and the defendant could not be located. One
hundred and seventy-three of those reported were indicted for first
degree murder. As this is very nearly one-half of the entire number
reported, it is quite obvious that many persons indicted for other
felonies were not being reported. A study of the situation soon made
it obvious that the reason for this was that the responsibility for
reporting was laid upon the clerk of. the court. His duty does not
include knowledge of the previous record of the defendant, with the
result that in many cases the clerk was honestly ignorant of the fact
that the latter had been previously convicted or indicted as provided
by the statute. Fortunately, in Massachusetts, the probation system
has developed as an adjunct the .function of informing the court
concerning cases and in 1926 a law was passed compelling the pro-
bation officer in every case where the crime charged might be pun-
ished by a sentence of more than one year to investigate the previous
record of the individual and present his findings to the court. This
investigation of the previous record already being a duty of the
probation officer, the 1927 General Court was quite willing to amend
the law to provide that "whenever the probation officer of such court
has in his possession or whenever the inquiry which he is required
to make by Section 85 of Chapter 276 discloses facts which, if knowr
to the clerk, would require notice, as aforesaid, such probation officer
shall forthwith communicate the same to the clerk who shall there-
upon give such notice unless already given." s This amendment will
7For provisions regarding commitment and release of these groups, see Gen.
Laws, ch. 123, sees. 90, 99-105.
SCh. 59, Acts of 1927.
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become effective on July 1, 1927, and should result in a marked in-
crease in the number of cases reported to the department, thereby
augmenting materially the efficiency and scope of the present act.
In view of the loosely made claims of some who are not familiar
with the facts that psychiatrists if given their own way would find
all offenders psychotic or mentally defective or psychopathic, it is of
interest to note that of the entire number examined (two hundred
and ninety-five), only twenty-one per cent were diagnosed as either
insane, mentally defective, or as psychopathic personalities. 9
In addition to hospitals for the mentally ill, schools for the feeble-
minded, and the various types of penal institutions well known in
other states, Massachusetts is one of the few states which has an
institution for defective delinquents, that is, feeble-minded persons
who are also delinquent. Although there are certain restrictions on
the definition of defective delinquents, this institution has proved its
usefulness and many persons have been committed thereto by the
court on the recommendation of the psychiatrists appointed by the
department of mental diseases. The commitment here is a totally
indeterminate one, as in the case of persons committed to state
hospitals as insane. °
As has been pointed out above, the routine examination of
prisoners applies only to certain groups of felons. Other facilities
as well for the psychiatric examination of prisoners are available
to the court. For instance, any person under complaint or indict-
ment may at any time be committed to a state hospital as insane or
for observation as to his mental condition." Wide discretion is given
to the court regarding the provisions of the commitment and, as is
to be expected, the courts are disposed to act upon the recommenda-
tions made by the state hospitals in the cases of persons so com-
mitted. This law is employed freely by the courts. More recently,
a law was passed providing that any court may call upon the De-
partment of Mental Diseases to assign a member of a state hospital
staff to examine any person coming before the court.12 Thus even
a complainant might conceivably be examined, and properly so. No
fee is paid for this examination so that the court need not feel
hampered in any way by the prospect of undue expense. The Bos-
9For an exhaustive study of the working and possibilities of this law, see
Sheldon Glueck, "Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime," Yale
Law Jour., vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 632-648, March, 1927.
1OFor the provisions of law relating to the commitment and discharge of
defective delinquents, see Gen. Laws, ch. 123, secs. 113-124.
"Gen. Laws, ch. 123, sec. 100.
12Gen. Laws, ch. 123, sec. 99.
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ton Municipal Court is the only court in the state having an official
court psychiatrist. Several of the district courts, however, have
availed themselves of the services of interested psychiatrists who
have volunteered to serve without compensation.
In 1924 the routine examination of prisoners in the houses of
correction (county penal institutions) was commenced by the De-
partment of Mental Diseases. 3 In these cases a complete social
history is obtained and a physical examination and psychometric test
are made. The prisoner is then examined by a psychiatrist. Rec-
ommendations in each case are made and forwarded to the Depart-
ment of Correction, which attends to the follow-up of suitable cases.
Copies of the report are also sent to the Commission on Probation
and are available to the courts of the state should the prisoner again
be arraigned. These reports in addition to giving a psychiatric diag-
nosis contain much information which is of value from the social
point of view and are of considerable help to the courts and pro-
bation officers in understanding the factors of the defendant's de-
linquency. They are being used in increasing numbers and their
possibilities are being appreciated.
The day of the routine treatment of offenders, of a blind fol-
lowing by courts of the penological doctrines of Beccaria, is passing.
Judges are growing in a realization of the fact that the defendants
coming before them for disposition differ each from the other in back-
ground, and in mental makeup. Within the limitations imposed upon
them by the constitution, by law, and by tradition, they are more
and more and more showing a readiness to be enlightened and to
learn how they may the better conform the treatment to the in-
dividual's needs, and thereby best protect society. The Massachusetts
procedure already described will almost inevitably be adopted by
other states and also extended in scope. By removing expert testi-
mony from the sphere of partisanship it is but the forerunner of a
period of more enlightened exercise of judicial discretion wherein
the courts, society and the offender will profit by the services of
trained social investigators and psychiatrists.
23Ch. 309, Acts of 1924.
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